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LIABILITY OF BAIL BONDSMEN UNDER SECTION 1983
Various forms of bail' release currently exist in the United States.
2 In
one form of bail release, the court requires the accused to contract with an
individual or agency in the business of writing bonds.3 If the professional
bondsman writes and posts the bonds with the court,4 the bondsman becomes
1. See Hatchett, Filling In The Gaps of Virginia Bail Reform, 14 U. RIcH. L. REy. 483,
484 (1980) (discussion of bail reform movement in Virginia). Under common law the term
"bail" means release secured by surety. Id. Recent usage of the term "bail" has expanded the
definition to include any release from custody regardless of the conditions imposed. Id. See
generally State v. Mitchell, 59 Del. 11, - 212 A.2d 873, 874-84 (Del. Super. Ct. 1965)
(discussion of history of bail). Bail originated in medieval England as a device to free untried
prisoners. Id. at __ , 212 A.2d at 880. In this early period, a sheriff would release a prisoner
on the promise of either the prisoner or a third party that the prisoner would appear for trial.
Id. If the prisoner failed to return for trial, the third-party surety had to take the prisoner's
place. Id. Consequently, to protect the surety's risk, the sheriff gave the surety custodial powers
over the prisoner. Id. In time, the bail system evolved to permit sureties to forfeit money,
instead of themselves, when the principal did not appear. Id. Eventually, the state transferred
bailing functions from the sheriff's office to the justice of the peace. Id.; see Note, Bail: An
Ancient Practice Reexamined, 70 YALE L.J. 966, 966-69 (1961) (discussion of history of bail).
2. See Toborg, Bail Bondsmen and Criminal Courts, 8 JusT. SYs. J. 141, 142-43 (1983)
(discussion of symbiotic relationship between bondsmen and criminal courts, and way in which
bondsmen facilitate court operations). In determining bail, a trial judge has the authority to
invoke one of four general forms of bail release. Id. at 141. First, the judge may release the
accused on the condition that the accused promise to appear for subsequent court dates. Id.
Second, the judge may release the accused to the custody of a pretrial release program, other
agency, or a third party. Id. Third, the judge may require the accused to post a percentage of
the amount of the bond, usually ten percent, with the court. Id. Courts using the third
alternative generally refund most of the ten percent fee to a defendant who has appeared on
the specified trial dates. Id. Finally, if a deposit bond is not feasible for the accused, the
accused may contract with a professional bondsman. Id.
3. See id. at 141. The accused pays the bondsman a fee, typically ten percent of the
amount of the bond, in return for writing the bond. Id. at 142.
4. See id. at 142. The bondsman has total discretion in deciding whether to write the
bond. Id. The bondsman will base his decision on financial considerations and the expected
ease or difficulty of producing the defendant. Id.; see also Reiss, The Long Arm of John
Light's Law, 4 Wash. Post. Mag., Jan. 29, 1984 (description of Washington, D.C. bail bond
business from bondsman's perspective) [hereinafter cited as The Long Arm]. In Washington,
D.C., the complicated process of writing and posting a bond may take hours. Id. at 11. The
jailed defendant or the defendant's lawyer calls the family who then calls a bondsman. Id. A
family member then visits the bondsman and fills out the bond application. Id. Next, the
bondsman investigates the family member's identification as well as the charge sheet and the
bail agency's sheet, both of which describe the prior arrest record of the accused. Id. At this
point, the bondsman decides whether to write the bond by assessing the risks involved. Id.
Generally the bondsman writes bonds for 25 out of 100 applicants. Id. After deciding to write
the bond, the bondsman fills out a bond sheet and a jail release sheet, and deposits the papers
in the superior court finance office. Id. The finance office calls the jail, and the jail verifies the
charges and the amount of the bond. Id. The bondsman then picks up the accused at the
receiving and discharge area of the jail, escorts the accused to the finance office, and signs the
bond swearing to abide by the rules and conditions that the judge has set. Id. As compensation,
the bondsman receives ten percent of the bond. Id. A judge usually will give the bondsman
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a surety on the contract. 5 The surety is liable to the court setting the bail for
the full face value of the bond should the accused, or principal, not appear. 6
However, courts generally will provide the surety with a specified period of
time in which to find and return the fugitive principal to the court's
jurisdiction to avoid forfeiture on the bond.7 Ironically, the law provides
greater authority to a bail bondsman in returning a fugitive principal who
has violated the conditions of bail, than the law provides to a law enforcement
officer returning an escaped prisoner."
The prevailing view in most courts today is that bondsmen possess
extremely broad common-law grants of authority in effectuating the arrest
of a principal. 9 The United States Supreme Court first addressed the issue
of the authority of bondsmen in 1869 in Reese v. United States.10 In Reese,
the sureties had posted a bond for a principal charged with land fraud."
fourteen days to catch a bail jumper, but if the police capture the jumper first, the bondsman
probably will forfeit the bond money. Id. at 12.
5. See Toborg, supra note 2, at 142; see also State v. Mitchell, 59 Del. 11, -, 212
A.2d 873, 884 (Del. Super. Ct. 1965) (description of bail bond as contract between government
on one side and principal and surety on other).
6. See R. Fleming, PUNISHMENT BEFORE TRIAL 3 (1982) (comparison of widely divergent
bail processes in Detroit and Baltimore). When writing a bond, a surety may require the
principal to provide collateral in the form of personal property to secure release. Id. at 3.
7. See id. at 131.
8. See A Proposal to Modify Existing Procedures Governing the Interstate Rendition of
Fugitive Bailees: Hearing on S.2855 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights and the
Subcomm. on Improvement in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th
Cong., 2nd Sess. 4 (1966) (statement of Joseph Tydings, Chairman, Subcomm. on Improvements
in Judicial Machinery). See generally The Long Arm, supra note 4, at 8. The Long Arm
included a description of the capture, by John Light, a Washington, D.C. bail bondsman, of a
principal named Meredith Green. Id. at 8. Light traced Green from the District of Columbia
to a Maryland apartment. Id. at 8. With the help of an agent, Light burst through the door
and demanded that Green surrender. Id. At this point, Light shot Green, and in the process
accidentally shot the agent as well. Id. Light claimed that Green had drawn a gun, but no gun
was found. Id. Following the shooting, Light dragged Green, in the presence of police, 500
yards across the Maryland District of Columbia state line to where District of Columbia police
were waiting. Id. Only then was Green taken to a hospital. Id.
9. See, e.g., Kear v. Hilton, 699 F.2d 181, 182 (4th Cir. 1983) (professional bondsmen
in United States enjoy extraordinary powers to capture and use force to compel return of
principal); Allied Fidelity Corp. v. Commissioner, 572 F.2d 1190, 1193 (7th Cir. 1978) (surety
has broad powers of custody over principal) cert. denied, 439 U.S. 835 (1978); Stuyvesant Ins.
Co. v. United States, 410 F.2d 524, 525-27 (8th Cir. 1969) (surety needs no warrant and may
go anywhere in United States to arrest principal); Curtis v. Peerless Ins. Co., 299 F. Supp. 429,
435 (D. Minn. 1969) (common law is clear on right of surety to take principal into custody,
wherever principal may be, and deliver principal to proper authorities); Livingston v. Browder,
51 Ala. Ct. App. 366, 368, 285 So. 2d 923, 925 (Ct. Civ. App. 1973) (bondsman may exercise
great discretion in arresting principal).
10. 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 13 (1869) (Court held that United States could not recover against
sureties who had not produced principal when government had consented to principal's travels
beyond reach of sureties).
11. Id. at 14.
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Without informing the sureties, the government gave the principal permission
to leave the United States.' 2 When the principal failed to appear at subsequent
trial dates, the United States Circuit Court for the District of California
ordered a forfeiture on the bond. 3 The United States Supreme Court
reversed, holding that the precise terms of the contract between the surety
and the principal limited the liability of the surety.' 4 In reaching its decision,
the Reese Court addressed the issue of the common-law authority of sure-
ties. 5 The Court stated that a principal is subject to the complete custody
of the surety to the extent that the surety at any time may arrest and
surrender the principal to the court issuing the bond.' 6 Additionally, the
Reese Court stated that the surety may exercise the arrest power only within
the territory of the United States.'
7
In 1872, the Supreme Court issued the seminal statement concerning the
common-law powers of sureties in Taylor v. Taintor.'8 The issue in Taylor,
as in Reese, concerned a forfeiture of a bond.' 9 In Taylor, the bondsmen
had posted an 8,000 dollar bond in Connecticut for a principal who faced a
charge of grand larceny. 20 Before the principal could appear at trial, however,
the Governor of Maine requested the arrest of the principal on a Maine
burglary charge.2' At the time of the principal's Connecticut trial for grand
larceny, the principal was imprisoned legally in Maine.22 The sureties sued
to recover the amount of the bond claiming impossibility of performance of
12. Id. at 15.
13. Id. at 16.
14. Id. at 22.
15. Id. at 21-22. The Reese Court distinguished the liabilities of a surety on a personal
recognizance from a surety on an ordinary bond or commercial contract. Id. at 21. According
to the Court, the surety on a personal recognizance may discharge himself on the contract at
any time by surrendering the principal to the court issuing the bond. id. The death of the
principal also discharges the surety. Id. A surety on an ordinary bond or commercial contract
is liable until payment of the debt or performance of the stipulated act. Id. The precise terms
of the contract, however, limit liability for both types of sureties. Id.
16. See id. at 21 (surety may not subject principal to constant imprisonment).
17. Id. at 21-22.
18. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 366 (1872). Almost every court hearing a case concerning the
extraordinary arrest powers and authority of sureties cites or quotes Taylor v. Taintor. See,
e.g., Kear v. Hilton, 699 F.2d 181, 182 (4th Cir. 1983) (citing Taylor as source for extraordinary
powers of sureties); Allied Fidelity Corp. v. Commissioner, 572 F.2d 1190, 1193 (7th Cir. 1978)
(citing Taylor as basis for broad powers of surety) cert. denied, 439 U.S. 835 (1978); Maynard
v. Kear, 474 F. Supp. 794, 803 (N.D. Ohio 1979) (quoting Taylor as settling issue of common-
law right of recapture by surety); Citizens for Pre-Trial Justice v. Goldfarb, 88 Mich. App.
519, 565, 278 N.W.2d 653, 676 (1979) (quoting Taylor for court approval of common-law
authority of bondsman to arrest and surrender principal) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part), modified, 327 N.W.2d 910 (1982).
19. Taylor, 83 U.S. at 368-69.
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the contract.23 The Supreme Court held that since the sureties' dominion
over the principal was so complete, the sureties were under obligation to
keep the principal within the sureties' jurisdiction. 24 The sureties, therefore,
had to forfeit the bond.2 The Taylor Court reaffirmed the almost unlimited
authority and discretion of sureties to arrest and deliver a principal to the
court issuing the bond.
26
The next major case addressing the issue of a surety's power over a
principal was Fitzpatrick v. Williams.27 In Fitzpatrick, the New Orleans
police arrested Fitzpatrick on affidavits charging the accused with having
committed an offense in the state of Washington, and with being a fugitive
from justice.28 Despite dismissal of the charges, Fitzpatrick remained in the
custody of the New Orleans police.29 Fitzpatrick applied for a writ of habeas
corpus. 30 A bonding company intervened in the proceedings, alleging that
the company had posted a 1,500 dollar bond. 3' The bonding company asked
the court to order the sheriff .to surrender Fitzpatrick to the company's
agent.3 2 The trial court denied Fitzpatrick's writ and ordered the sheriff to
surrender Fitzpatrick to the agent.33 The United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit affirmed the denial of the writ on the basis of the broad
arrest powers granted to sureties. 34 While reaffirming the Taylor common-
law principles, however, the Fitzpatrick court emphasized a slightly different
rationale for granting broad arrest powers to sureties.3" In the Fitzpatrick
decision, the Fifth Circuit stressed the private contract aspect of the surety-
principal relationship. 6 The Fifth Circuit stated that the authority of a surety
to recapture a principal is not a matter of criminal procedure, but instead
arises from a private contract between a surety and a principal. 7 Because
23. Id. at 368-69.
24. Id. at 371-75.
25. See id. at 369-75.
26. Id. at 371. The Supreme Court in Taylor v. Taintor specified certain arrest powers of
sureties. Id. The Taylor Court stated that sureties may arrest and deliver a principal at any time
and arrest a principal in any state. Id. Additionally, the Taylor Court stated that sureties may
act in person or hire agents. Id. Furthermore, the Court stated that under common law, sureties
may imprison a principal until delivery is possible. Id. Finally, the Court acknowledged that
sureties have the authority to break and enter into a principal's house for the purpose of
arresting the principal. Id.
27. 46 F.2d 40 (5th Cir. 1931).






34. Id. at 41-42.
35. See id. at 40-42 (discussion of powers of sureties as arising from private contract).
36. Id. at 40.
37. Id. at 40. In Fitzpatrick v. Williams, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit found no conflict between the interests of the state and the interests of the bondsman.
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the right of recapture is a private right involving no governmental procedure,
the Fitzpatrick court concluded that a surety has no need to obtain an arrest
warrant or to seek extradition when returning a principal across state lines.38
The lower courts have upheld the basic common-law principles enunciated
in Reese, Taylor and Fitzpatrick on numerous occasions2 9
The bondsman's source of authority to arrest and surrender the principal
derives not only from the common law, but also from state statutes.4 Several
states have eliminated commercial bail as a method of pretrial release. 4'
Some states have attempted to modify the common law concerning bail
bondsmen by regulating surety arrest conduct.4 2 In other states, however,
Id. at 40-41. The Fifth Circuit also stated that the right of the surety to recapture the principal
was a private, not a governmental, remedy. Id. at 40. Furthermore, the Fitzpatrick court held
that although the surety may arrest and surrender the principal before the bond is due, the state
could not. Id. at 41. The Fifth Circuit, therefore, noted that since the state had no right of
discretionary rearrest and removal, the surety could not acquire the right to arrest through
subrogation. Id. at 42. The Fitzpatrick court held that the right to arrest was an original right
arising from the relationship between the principal and the surety. Id. Additionally, the
Fitzpatrick court indicated that the acquisition of rights through subrogation distinguished a
civil surety from a surety on recognizance. Id. at 41; see supra note 15 (discussion by Reese
Court of difference between surety on personal recognizance and surety on commercial contract).
38. See Fitzpatrick, 46 F.2d at 41.
39. See e.g., Stuyvesant Ins. Co. v. United States, 410 F.2d 524, 525 (8th Cir. 1969)
(court cited Reese as support for authority of bondsman to arrest principal anywhere in United
States without warrant); Curtis v. Peerless Ins. Co., 299 F. Supp. 429, 435 (D. Minn. 1969)
(court cited Taylor and Fitzpatrick as support for authority of bondsman to recapture principal
without risking liability to principal); Thomas v. Miller, 282 F. Supp. 571, 573 (E.D. Tenn.
1968) (court cited Taylor and Fitzpatrick as support for authority of surety to arrest and remove
principal from Ohio to Tennessee); Citizens for Pre-Trial Justice v. Goldfarb, 88 Mich. App.
519, 565-66, 278 N.W.2d 653, 674 (1979) (court cited Taylor and Fitzpatrick as support for
constitutionality of Michigan statute codifying common-law rights and liabilities of sureties on
bail bond contract, modified, 327 N.W.2d 910 (1982); see also Taylor v. Taintor, 83 U.S. (16
Wall.) 366, 371 (1872) (Court stated common law powers of sureties to arrest and deliver
principals); Reese v. United States, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 13, 21-22 (1869) (Court discussed almost
unlimited authority of sureties over principals); Fitzpatrick v. Williams, 46 F.2d 40, 40-42 (5th
Cir. 1931) (court affirmed Taylor common-law principles under private contract analysis); supra
notes 15-17 and accompanying text (discussion of Reese decision concerning authority of
sureties); supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text (discussion of Taylor concerning authority
of sureties); supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text (discussion of Fitzpatrick decision
concerning common-law powers of sureties).
40. See generally, Hansen, The Professional Bondsman: A State Action Analysis, 30
CLEv. ST. L. REv. 595, 604-09, 621-26 (1981) (survey of state statutes regulating bonding
process).
41. See Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, § 110-1 to § 110-17 (1980) (statute permits ten percent
deposit bail exclusive of corporate bail); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 431-510 (Baldwin 1976) (practice of
issuing corporate bond is criminal offense); Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 134.255, 135.260 and 135.265
(1979) (pretrial release permitted only through personal recognizance, supervised or conditional
release, and ten percent deposit bonds).
42. See generally Hansen, supra note 40, at 621-26. Connecticut requires a surety to verify
under oath that a principal intends to escape before issuing an arrest warrant. Conn. Gen. Stat.
§§ 54-65, 52-319 (West 1978). Moreover, only law enforcement personnel in Connecticut may
arrest principals. Id. § 52-319 (West 1978). In Texas, sureties may arrest principals only after
obtaining arrest warrants from the judiciary. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 17.19 (Vernon
19851
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courts view the relevant statute as merely codifying the common law, and
determine the scope of the surety's authority by the principles described in
Taylor 3. 4 Almost all states that permit the activities of professional bondsmen
1977). Many states require sureties to obtain written authority endorsed on a certified copy of
the bond, or bail piece, before arresting principals. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 15-13-62 (1975); Ark.
Stat. Ann. § 43-717 (1977); Cal. Penal Code § 1301 (West 1982); Idaho Code § 19-2925 (1979);
Mo. Ann. Stat. § 544.600 (Vernon 1949); Mont. Code Ann. § 46-9-205 (1984); Ohio Rev. Code
Ann. § 2713.22 (Baldwin 1982); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 22 § 1107 (West 1951); Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 40-11-133 (1982); Utah Code Ann. § 77-43-23 (1982); Va. Code § 19.2-149 (1950); Wisc. Stat.
Ann. § 818.21 (West 1977). Alabama, Nevada, Tennessee, Missouri and Oklahoma have enacted
statutes permitting sureties to arrest principals only within the jurisdiction of the state. See Ala.
Code § 15-13-63 (1975); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 544.600 (Vernon 1949); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 178.526
(1979); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, § 1107 (West 1951); Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-11-133 (1982).
California requires California sureties to surrender a principal within forty-eight hours after the
arrest. Cal. Penal Code § 1301 (West 1982); see also Cal. Penal Code § 847.5 (West 1970)
(statute regulating surety arrests by foreign bondsmen).
Section 847.5 of the California Penal Code abrogates the foreign bondsman's common-law
right to recapture and remove a principal from California. Id. The bondsman must file an
affidavit with a magistrate in the California county where the fugitive is present, stating the
name and location of the fugitive, the offense charged and other particulars. Id. If the magistrate
concludes that probable cause exists for believing that the person alleged to be the fugitive is
such, the magistrate may issue an arrest warrant. Id. Any arrest made, therefore, is upon
authority of the warrant. Id. Following the arrest, the magistrate must hold an additional
hearing at which the principal may have counsel. Id. After the hearing, if satisfied with the
evidence, the magistrate may issue an order permitting the bondsman to return the fugitive to
the court from which the fugitive escaped bail. Id. Any arrest not made pursuant to the statute
is a misdemeanor offense. Id.; see Ouzts v. Maryland Nat'l Ins. Co., 505 F.2d 547, 552-55 (9th
Cir. 1974) (en banc) (interpretation of § 847.5 of California Penal Code), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
949 (1975). In Ouzts v. Maryland Nat'l Ins. Co., Las Vegas police arrested and charged Ouzts
with obtaining money under false pretenses in October, 1965. Id. at 549. The Justice Court for
the Township of Las Vegas set bail at $2,500. Id.
Defendant Embrey, agent for the bonding company, posted bond. Id. Darrow and Iola Peterson
executed the agreement as indemnitors. Id. Ouzts left Nevada and eventually resided in Long
Beach, California. Id. The Petersons travelled to California and unsuccessfully attempted to
arrest Ouzts on November 3, 1966, contrary to § 847.5 of the California Code. Id.; see Cal.
Penal Code § 847.5 (West 1970) (provisions requires foreign surety to obtain arrest warrant).
The Petersons then attempted to comply with the California Code by obtaining an arrest
warrant. 505 F.2d at 549. Finally on November 18, 1966, the Petersons hired another agent,
W. I. Lagatella, to take Ouzts into custody and deliver Ouzts to Las Vegas. Id. Lagatella and
an associate arrested and delivered Ouzts to Embrey and the Petersons in San Pedro. Id. at
550. The arrest of Ouzts allegedly involved the use of force. Id. at 550. The Petersons and
Embry delivered Ouzts to Las Vegas. Id. at 550. The police jailed Ouzts from November 18 to
November 29, 1966. Id. at 556 (Hufstedler, J. dissenting). On January 6, 1967, the Justice
Court for the Township of Las Vegas dismissed the criminal complaint against Ouzts without
a hearing. Id. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the bondsman
completely violated, not merely exceeded, the authority granted to sureties by the California
statute. Id. at 554. According to the Ninth Circuit, § 847.5 completely terminates a foreign
bondsman's common-law recapture right. Id.
43. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text (discussion of common law powers of
sureties); Citizens for Pre-Trial Justice v. Goldfarb, 88 Mich. App. 519, 564-67, 278 N.W.2d
653, 676-77 (1979) (court held Michigan statute codifying common-law powers of sureties
constitutional), modified 327 N.W.2d 910 (1982). In Citizens for Pre-Trial Justice v. Goldfarb,
the Court of Appeals of Michigan contended, in dicta, that Michigan Comp. Laws § 765.26
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have failed to enact statutes which establish procedural safeguards controlling
surety arrests. 44
The lack of procedural safeguards in surety arrests has resulted in many
cases of surety abuse of principals4 and their families.46 Because sureties
possess such universally accepted authority to make arrests, courts may
prefer to dispose of particular instances of surety abuse of principals by
relying on tenuous analysis rather than impose liability on a surety for
regulating the activities of the bail bondsmen was unconstitutional. Id. at 551-61, 278 N.W.2d
at 668-74; see also Mich. Comp. Laws § 765.26 (1982) (regulation of activities of bail bondsman).
The Goldfarb court contended that the statute was an unconstitutional grant of an arrest power
in violation of the due process clauses of the state and federal constitutions. Goldfarb, Id. at
551, 278 N.W.2d at 668. According to the Goldfarb court, the Michigan statute did not require
a surety to articulate reasons for revocation of a bail bond, or establish standards defining
permissible circumstances for revocation. Id. at 552, 278 N.W.2d at 668. Additionally the
Goldfarb court contended, in dicta, that the statute was unconstitutional because the statute
failed to require the procedural safeguards applicable to civil arrests in violation of the fourteenth
amendment to the United States Constitution. Id. at 556, 278 N.W.2d at 670. The dissent,
however, concurred with the majority opinion, except for the portion holding the statute
unconstitutional. Id. at 564, 278 N.W.2d at 674 (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part). The dissent stated that the pertinent statute represented the State of Michigan's return to
the common-law rights and liabilities of sureties on a bail bond contract. Id. at 556, 278 N.W.2d
at 674. Because the dissent constituted a majority of the three judge panel, the Michigan statute
regulating bail bond practices was constitutional. Id. at 567, 278 N.W.2d at 675.
44. See Hansen, supra note 40, at 623 (survey of state statutes regulating bonding process).
45. See, e.g., Dunkin v. Lamb, 500 F. Supp. 184, 188 (D. Nev. 1980) (bondsmen beat
principal in presence of police at police station); Maynard v. Kear, 474 F. Supp. 794, 799 (N.D.
Ohio 1979) (bondsmen seized, beat and dragged principal clad only in underwear from apartment
at night in January); Hill v. Toll, 320 F. Supp. 185, 186 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (bail bonding agents
allegedly beat and robbed principal at detention center in presence of detention center officials);
Thomas v. Miller, 282 F. Supp. 571, 572 (E.D. Tenn. 1968) (bondsman allegedly forced chained
and handcuffed principal to lie on the floor of car during trip from Ohio to Tennessee);
McCaleb v. Peerless Ins. Co., 250 F. Supp. 512, 513-15 (D. Neb. 1965) (bondsman seized and
held principal for eighty hours while demanding money from principal's parents and unspecified
others); United States v. Trunko, 189 F. Supp. 559, 565 (E.D. Ark. 1960) (court characterized
treatment of principal by bondsman as unreasonable, high-handed and oppressive); Nicolls v.
Ingersoll, 7 Johns. 145, 147-8 (N.Y. 1810) (bondsman used "great roughness" in arresting
principal); State v. Lingerfelt, 14 S.E. 75, 75 (N.C. 1891) (bondsman and agent shot and killed
principal); Poteete v. Olive, Tenn., 527 S.W.2d 84, 86 (Tenn. 1975) (bondsman broke principal's
leg).
46. See United States v. Trunko, 189 F. Supp. 559, 561-62 (E.D. Ark. 1960) (method of
surety arrest excited and upset principal's wife); Mease v. State, 165 Ga. App. 746, 747-50, 302
S.E.2d 429, 430-31 (1983) (drunken bondsmen using abusive language and waving pistol forced
way into home of principal's mother). Mease v. State involved a criminal trespass charge that
the State of Georgia brought against two licensed female bondsmen. Mease, 165 Ga. App. at
747, 302 S.E.2d at 430. After drinking at six different bars during the night, bondsmen Mease
and Burke arrived at the home of the principal's mother at 5:00 a.m. Id. at 749, 302 S.E.2d at
432 (Deen, J., dissenting). After pounding on the door and gaining entry, the bondsmen
conduced a fruitless search of the mother's house without permission. Id. at 747, 302 S.E.2d
at 430. The conduct of the bondsmen during the search included the use of profanity and
obscene language, belligerent attitudes, and the pointing and waving of a pistol. Id. at 747-78,
302 S.E.2d at 430-31. The bondsmen continued the search despite the mother's insistence that
1985]
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abusing his authority.' For example, in McCaleb v. Peerless Insurance Co.,4s
the principal, McCaleb, instituted suit to recover damages in tort for false
arrest and imprisonment, illegal detention, violation of civil liberties.
4 9
McCaleb, who had violated certain traffic laws in Omaha, contracted with
defendant Vinci, a bondsman for Peerless Insurance Company, to post a
200 dollar bond.50 McCaleb left Omaha for California and did not return
for the scheduled court appearance .5 Vinci went to California and hired
another agent who arrest McCaleb at his parents' home and took McCaleb
to the local jail.52 After Vinci gained control of McCaleb's car, Vinci took
McCaleb out of jail and drove McCaleb around the state for eighty hours. 3
Vinci placed McCaleb in different jails throughout California during the 80
hour trip.14 Vinci shackled McCaleb around the waist and wrists and kept
the shackles on at all times that McCaleb was not in jail. 55 Vinci and McCaleb
reached Omaha five days after the initial arrest.5 6 Upon arriving in Omaha,
Vinci took the title to McCaleb's automobile and forced McCaleb to sign a
release.5 7 Thereupon, Vinci told McCaleb to leave Nebraska, although McCaleb
was scheduled to appear before the municipal court of the city of Omaha in
one hour.58 Vinci never did surrender McCaleb to the Omaha municipal
the principal was not there and despite the mother's demands that the bondsmen leave. Id. at
750, 302 S.E.2d at 432 (Deen, J., dissenting). The Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia
held that the bondsmen were not guilty of criminal trespass because the bondsmen had entered
the house for a lawful reason. Id. at 747-48, 302 S.E.2d at 430. Additionally, the Mease court
held that bondsman Mease was not guilty of reckless conduct, but did affirm Mease's
misdemeanor convictions of pointing a pistol at another. Id. at 718-49, 302 S.E.2d at 431. The
dissent contended that the legal right to arrest one person does not include the right to run
rampant through a third party's home in violation of the third party's constitutional rights. Id.
at 749, 302 S.E.2d at 433 (Deen, J., dissenting).
47. See Poteete v. Olive, 527 S.W.2d 84, 88 (Tenn. 1975); see also infra notes 48-59 and
accompanying text (discussion of McCaleb v. Peerless). In Poteete v. Olive, a bondsman's
agents beat and kicked a principal and broke the principal's leg while making an arrest. Poteete,
527 S.W.2d at 86. The principal wore a series of casts for two months and required crutches
for four more months. Id. The principal sued for false imprisonment, assault and battery. Id.
at 85. The Tennessee Supreme Court decided the case on the narrow grounds that the arrest
was illegal because the agents had violated a Tennessee statute by not obtaining and displaying
a certified copy of the endorsed bond. Id. at 88; see Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-1 (1982) (copy of
an endorsed bond substitutes for a warrant).
48. 250 F. Supp. 512 (D. Neb. 1965).
49. Id. at 513. (Plaintiff alleged violation of liberties under Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but
court did not address § 1983 claim).





55. Id. (court also noted that Vinci fed McCaleb during return trip to Omaha and release
McCaleb from shackles).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 514-15.
58. Id. at 515.
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court.5 9 McCaleb, a 1965 decision, is the first reported case in which a court
held a bondsman, who had exceeded his authority as surety, liable to the
principal in tort.60 Despite the abuse of the principal by the surety, the
McCaleb court awarded monetary damages to the principal on the grounds
that the bondsmen had not arrested McCaleb for the purpose of surrendering
McCaleb to the proper authorities. 6' The decision in McCaleb does not
indicate whether the Nebraska court would have imposed tort liability on
the surety if the surety had surrendered McCaleb to the court.
Recently, litigants have challenged the practices and authority of bonds-
men under section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code.6 2 Section 1983
provides a remedy for deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution and
laws of the United States when the deprivation takes place "under color of
state law."' 63 To prevail against a surety in a section 1983 suit, a principal
must show that a bondsman acted under color of state law. 64 Additionally,
a principal must show that the action of the bondsman deprived the principal
of a constitutional or legal right.
65
To date, four courts have held that bondsmen were acting under color
of state law in arresting a principal. 66 In United States v. Trunko,67 a
bondsman holding a commission as a special deputy sheriff displayed a
59. Id.
60. See Note, The Hunters and the Hunted: Rights and Liabilities of Bailbondsmen, 6
FoRDHAm URB. L.J. 333, 342 (1978) (examination of bail bondsman's arrest power and various
remedies through tort and civil rights suits).
61. McCaleb, 250 F. Supp. at 515. In McCaleb v. Peerless Ins. Co., the principal received
$4000 in damages from the bonding company for the value of McCaleb's automobile and for
illegal imprisonment. Id. at 516.
62. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) (person acting under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom or usage, of any state, who deprives another of any right, privilege or
immunity secured by United States Constitution, is liable in action at law); infra notes 97-104
and accompanying text (discussion of § 1983 requirements and relationship between "color of
state law" and "state action" requirements); infra notes 67-96 and accompanying text (discussion
of cases challenging the authority and practices of bail bondsmen under § 1983).
63. See supra note 62 (text of § 1983).
64. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) (statute provides remedy for deprivation of constitutional
or legal right by person acting under color of state law). Several courts have analyzed the
elements necessary to establish a principal's claim under § 1983. See, e.g., Ouzts v. Maryland
Nat'l Ins. Co., 505 F.2d 547, 550 (9th Cir. 1974); Maynard v. Kear, 474 F. Supp. 794, 797
(N.D. Ohio 1979); Smith v. Rosenbaum, 333 F. Supp. 35, 38 (E.D. Pa. 1971) aff'd, 460 F.2d
1019 (1972); Hill v. Toll, 320 F. Supp. 185, 186 (E.D. Pa. 1970). See generally Note, The
Supreme Court Corrals A Runaway Section 1983, 34 MERCER L. REv. 1073, 1074-83 (1983)
(discussion of history of § 1983 and threshold requisites).
65. See supra note 64 (cases discussing elements of claim under § 1983).
66. See infra notes 67-79 and accompanying text (discussion of federal court decisions
holding that bondsmen acted under color of state law).
67. 189 F. Supp. 559 (E.D. Ark. 1960). In United States v. Trunko, the principal,
Williams, owed a fee of $50 to the bonding company for a $500 bond posted on a charge of
driving while intoxicated. Id. at 560. Williams left Ohio and returned to the Arkansas home of
Williams' father. Id. The bonding company sent a special investigator, Trunko, to locate
Williams. Id. at 560-61. Trunko and a companion, Pratt, arrived at the father's home before
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badge and a court-issued bench warrant when arresting the principal. 6 The
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Ohio held that
because the bondsman possessed apparent authority of the state, the bonds-
man acted under color of state law. 69 In Smith v. Rosenbaum,70 the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that the
act of lodging a bail piece7' against a principal pursuant to a Pennsylvania
law constituted an act under color of state law. 72 Similarly, in Maynard v.
Kear,7 the agents of a bonding company purported to act pursuant to a
daylight. Id. at 581. Trunko and Pratt entered the house, and without knocking, entered the
room where Williams, his wife and infant child were asleep. Id. Trunko shone a flashlight into
Williams' face and directed Williams to get dressed. Id. Trunko handcuffed Williams and drove
away at a high rate of speed, seemingly because Williams' wife threatened to call the sheriff.
Id. at 561-62. Trunko did not advise Williams that Trunko was acting as an agent of the
holding company. Id. at 562. The family did not know why Williams was arrested. Id. Trunko
falsely told Williams that they were going to Little Rock, Arkansas. Id. Two days later, Williams
pleaded guilty to the original charge of driving while intoxicated and the Municipal Court of
Ravenna, Ohio fined Williams $250, of which the court would suspend $100 if Williams
reimbursed the bondsman. Id. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Arkansas characterized the actions of the bondsmen as high-handed, unreasonable and oppres-
sive. Id. at 565.
68. Id. at 561.
69. Id. at 562.
70. 333 F. Supp. 35 (E.D. Pa. 1971), aff'd, 460 F.2d 1019 (1972). In Smith v. Rosenbaum,
Smith paid Rosenbaum $30 to post a bail bond because of Smith's arrest on a charge of
carrying a concealed weapon. Id. at 37. Smith also paid bondsman Marks to post bonds for
three other arrest charges. Id. The charges on the three other arrests included illegal possession
of narcotics, carrying a concealed weapon, attempted burglary and possession of burglary tools.
Id.
71. See generally Note, Bailbondsmen And The Fugitive Accused: The Need For Formal
Removal Procedures, 73 YALE L.J. 1098, 1102 (1964) (defining term "bail piece" as document
obtained from court official that is evidence of existence of bond relationship between surety
and principal).
72. Rosenbaum, 333 F. Supp. at 38. Under Pennsylvania state law, sureties are entitled
to a bail place, issued by the court upon which sureties may arrest and surrender a principal.
See id.; see also 19 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 53 (1964) (statute entitles sureties to possession of bail
piece upon which sureties may arrest principals). The bail piece is sufficient warrant or authority
for the sheriff to receive the principal. Rosenbaum, 333 F. Supp. at 38. Although the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in Smith v. Rosenbaum held that
the act of lodging the bail piece constituted action under color of state law, the principal failed
to allege that the bondsmen violated any of the principal's rights, privileges or immunities
secured under the Constitution. See id. at 39; see also infra note 88 and accompanying text
(discussion of principal's constitutional claim).
73. 474 F. Supp. at 794 (N.D. Ohio 1979). In Maynard v. Kear, agents of a Virginia
bonding company seized and beat Maynard late one January night in Ohio. Id. at 799. The
agents dragged Maynard, who was clad only in underwear, out of his apartment and handcuffed
Maynard in preparation for the trip back to Virginia. Id. Maynard's wife called the police, who
took Maynard and the bonding agents to the station house. Id. at 798-99. Upon advice from
the city prosecutor, the police released the bonding agents. Id. at 798. During the time the
agents were inside the station house, Maynard remained in the agents' car and received no




Virginia state bench warrant in arresting the principal in Ohio.7 4 Conse-
quently, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio
held that the bondmen were acting under color of state law. 7" The Maynard
court reasoned that the State of Virginia had lent authority to the private
bondsmen when the bondsmen arrested the principal in Ohio pursuant to a
bench warrant obtained under a Virginia state statute. 76 Finally, in Hill v.
Toll, 7 7 the United States District court for the Eastern District of Pennsyl-
vania also held that a bondsmen, acting pursuant to a state statute that
accorded bondsmen the right to conduct their business affairs by use of
physical coercion, 78 was acting under color of state law. 79 Other courts,
however, have refused to impose liability pursuant to section 1983 on bail
bondsmen, determining that the bondsmen were not acting under color of
state law. 0
Presently, three courts have addressed the issue of which specific consti-
tutional rights are applicable to the surety arrest procedure to meet the
constitutional deprivation requirement in section 1983 actions. 81 In Hill v.
Toll,12 the principal attacked the validity of his arrest as a breach of state
contract law.83 The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania held that because the principal had not alleged that the arrest
was unconstitutional, the single allegation of breach of contract law could
not form the basis for relief under section 1983.84 The Hill court held,
however, that the beating and robbery allegations of the principal constituted
74. Id. at 800.
75. Id. at 801.
76. Id.
77. 320 F. Supp. 185 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
78. See 19 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 53 (1964) (sureties are entitled to bail piece upon which
sureties may arrest and detain principals); see also supra note 71 (defining bail piece).
79. Hill, 320 F. Supp. at 187. In Hill v. Toll, two bonding agents entered the principal's
home, and seized and transported the principal to the Philadelphia Detention Center. Id. at
186. At the Center, the agents allegedly beat and robbed the principal in the presence of the
detention center officials. Id.
80. See, e.g., Ouzts v. Maryland Nat'l Ins. Co., 505 F.2d 547, 554 (9th Cir. 1974)
(bondsman did not act under color of state law because California statute specifically forbade
foreign bondsmen's common-law right of recapture); Thomas v. Miller, 282 F. Supp. 571, 572-
73 (E.D. Tenn. 1968) (bondsman's acts were result of private contractual relationship and not
under color of state law); see also Easley v. Blossom, 394 F. Supp. 343, 345 (S.D. Fla. 1975)
(court cited Thomas and Curtis as support for blanket statement concerning lack of state action
in bondsman's actions); Curtis v. Peerless Ins. Co., 299 F. Supp. 429, 431 (D. Minn. 1969)
(court dismissed § 1983 complaint because plaintiff failed to sufficiently allege color of state
law requirement).
81. See infra notes 81-95 and accompanying text (discussion of possible constitutional
rights that would meet one of two threshold requirements necessary for § 1983 suit); see also
supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text (discussion of two elements principal must establish
in § 1983 action).
82. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text (discussion of facts in Hill and color of
state law element).
83. See Hill, 320 F. Supp. at 187.
84. Id.
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a claim cognizable under section 1983.8s The court reasoned that allegations
of beating and robbery qualified as a claim of an unreasonable search and
seizure and, therefore, constituted a vi6lation of the principal's fourth and
fourteenth amendment rights. 86 One year after Hill, the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania faced a similar breach of
contract argument in Smith v. Rosenbaum.s7 In Rosenbaum, the principal
argued that the sureties had breached the bail contract by lodging bail pieces
against the principal, thereby depriving the principal of liberty without due
process of law. " The Rosenbaum court stated that the sureties had not
deprived the principal of liberty without due process by revoking the bail
bond contract because recent actions of the principal justified the revoca-
tion. 9 Consequently, the Rosenbaum court held that the principal had failed
to prove that the sureties had violated any of the principal's rights secured
under the Constitution."' Finally, in Maynard v. Kear,91 the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Ohio addressed the possible
constitutional claims of the principal, under the fourth, sixth and eighth
amendments in the principal's section 1983 action against the surety.92 The
Maynard court focused on the right of a principal to be free from the use
of unreasonable means and force in a surety arrest as the most relevant and
applicable fourth amendment right actionable under section 1983. 91 Addi-
tionally, the Maynard court stated that for the eighth amendment protections
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Rosenbaum, 333 F. Supp. at 35 (E.D. Pa. 1971); see supra notes 70-72 and accom-
panying text (discussion of facts in Rosenbaum and color of state law element).
88. Rosenbaum, 333 F. Supp. at 37, 38.
89. Id. at 38. In Smith v. Rosenbaum, the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania stated that the principal's later arrest, which increased the surety's risk,
justified the surety's revocation of the bail bond contract by lodging the bail pieces. Id.
Additionally, the Rosenbaum court stated that the failure of the principal to inform the
bondsman of a change of address also justified the revocation of the bond. Id. Furthermore,
the Rosenbaum court noted that the principal had contracted to lose his liberty if the authorities
rearrested the principal on another charge. Id. at 39. The Rosenbaum court addressed the issue
of the revocation of the bail bond contract. Id. at 37-39. The Rosenbaum court did not address
the issue of whether procedural requirements are necessary in making a surety arrest because
the Rosenbaum principal already was incarcerated for a subsequent offense. Id. at 37.
90. Id. at 39.
91. See supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text (discussion of facts in Maynard and
color of state law requirement).
92. Maynard, 474 F. Supp. at 801-04. In Maynard v. Kear, the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Ohio concluded that by knowingly and purportedly acting
under the authority of a state bench warrant, the bondsmen were acting under the color of
state law required for a fourteenth amendment and fourth amendment claim. Id. at 801.
93. Id. at 801-03. In Maynard v. Kear, the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Ohio stated that all of the protections of the fourth amendment applied with full
force to surety arrests with the possible exception of the requirement of an arrest warrant. Id.
at 802-03. The Maynard court focused on the rights guaranteed by the fourth amendment as
the most relevant of the constitutional rights that an abused principal has. Id. at 801-03.
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to extend to surety arrests, the alleged mistreatment must rise to the consti-
tutional dimensions of cruel and unusual punishment. 94 Finally the Maynard
court concluded that the principal had no claim under the sixth amendment
of a violation by the bondsman of a principal's right to extradition proceed-
ings.9" The Maynard court noted that under the common law a recapture of
the principal by a bondsman required no extradition proceedings. 96
The United States Supreme Court's recent decision in Lugar v. Edmond-
son Oil Co.97 clarifies the threshold requirements that a constitutionally
deprived individual such as an abused principal must establish when bringing
a section 1983 suit premised upon the fourteenth amendment. 9 The four-
teenth amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no state
may deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of
law. 99 Because the fourteenth amendment applies to the states, only conduct
94. Id. at 803; see Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102-03 (1976) (punishments that are
incompatible with evolving societal standards of decency, or which involve unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain, violate eighth amendment).
95. Maynard, 474 F. Supp. at 804.
96. Id. See generally Note, Interstate Rendition Violations and Section 1983: Locating the
Federal Rights of Fugitives, 50 FosRlAm L. REv. 1268, 1268-91 (1982) (discussion of federal
and state extradition provisions and requirements for maintaining a section 1983 action).
Violations of federal and state extradition provisions by law enforcement officials do not
support § 1983 actions because the provisions create no federal rights. Id. at 1270-87. Courts
should permit § 1983 actions, however, for violation of a fugitive's constitutional right to
challenge extradition by writ of habeas corpus. Id. at 1287-91; Note, supra note 71, at 1098-
1111 (1964) (discussion of necessity of extending sixth amendment right to full extradition-type
hearings to principals).
97. 457 U.S. 922,.923-39 (1982).
98. See id. at 923-39 (discussion of relationship between state action requirement of
fourteenth amendment and color of state law requirement of § 1983, and analysis of term
"state action"). In Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., petitioner Lugar was indebted to Edmondson
Oil Company, which sued on the debt in a Virginia state court. Id. at 924. Pursuant to a
Virginia state law, Edmondson sought prejudgment attachment of some of Lugar's property.
Id. Under the state statute Edmondson only had to allege that Lugar was disposing of or might
dispose of his property in order to attach the property. Id. Because of Edmondson's allegations,
the clerk of the state court issued a writ of attachment and the sheriff executed the writ. Id. A
state trial judge conducted a hearing on the propriety of the attachment, subsequent to the
execution of the writ and, thirty-four days after the levy, the judge ordered the attachment
dismissed. Id. at 925. The state trial judge found that Edmondson had failed to establish
statutory grounds for the attachment. Id. Lugar sued under § 1983, alleging deprivation of
property without due process of law. Id. Lugar sought compensatory and punitive damages.
Id. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the trial court's decision
that the actions of Edmondson did not constitute state action as required by the fourteenth
amendment. Id. The Fourth Circuit, therefore, held that Lugar had failed to state a claim upon
which a court could grant relief under § 1983. Id. On appeal, the United States Supreme Court
stated that private misuse of a state statute did not describe conduct fairly attributable to the
state. Id. at 941. The Court held, however, that insofar as Lugar's complaint challenged the
constitutionality 6f the Virginia attachment statute, Lugar had presented a valid cause of action.
Id. at 942. The Court demonstrated a concern with a statutory scheme in which officials could
attach property on the ex parte application of one party to a private dispute. Id. at 942.
99. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
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that a court may fairly characterize as state action, and not as private action,
will constitute a violation of the amendment.'°° Section 1983 requires both a
deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United
States, and that the deprivation result from an act under color of state law.' 0'
In Lugar, the Court addressed the relationship between the section 1983
requirement of action under color of state law and the fourteenth amendment
requirement of state action. 0 2 The Lugar Court held that whenever state
action is present, then action under color of state law is present for purposes
of a suit under section 1983.103 Consequently, in a section 1983 suit involving
the fourteenth amendment, a trial court will limit its inquiry to the state
action issue.' 4
The Lugar Court established a two-step procedure for determining
whether state action is present.?°s First, the exercise of some right or privilege
that the state has created, or the exercise of a state imposed rule of conduct,
must cause the deprivation of the constitutional right.' °6 Second, the party
charged with the deprivation must be a person who the courts fairly may
characterize as a "state actor."'0 7 The two steps merge when the accused
individual is a state official, but a court must treat the two steps separately
when the constitutional claim is against a private party. 08 When a section
1983 suit is directed against a private party, four tests apply in determining
whether that private party is a state actor.0 9 The Lugar Court declined to
hold whether the tests identifying a state actor operate separately or as a
whole." '0 In the first test, the "public function" test, a court considers
whether the private party performs that traditionally is within the exclusive
prerogative of the state."' Under the second test, the "state compulsion"
100. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 924.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 935.
104. Note, supra note 64, at 1073 (discussion of effect of Lugar and two other recent
Supreme Court decisions on § 1983).




109. Id. at 939.
110. Id. In Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., the United States Supreme Court indicated that
a court must sift the facts and weigh the circumstances of each case to determine the true
significance of state involvement in private conduct. Id.
Ill. See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 353 (1974) (Court applied
public function doctrine to only those powers traditionally associated with sovereignty). In
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., a customer of the defendant, Metropolitan Edison,
challenged the actions of the privately owned and operated utility corporation as violating due
process by terminating service without notice or opportunity to pay outstanding obligations. Id.
at 347-48. The Court held that the state action was not present because the state had no
obligation to furnish utility services and such service was not associated traditionally with
sovereignty. Id. at 353-54; see also Flagg Bros. Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 157 (1978) (Court
limited application of public function doctrine to powers traditionally reserved exclusively to
state). See generally Hansen, supra note 40 at 630-32 (discussion of public function doctrine).
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test, the state is responsible for a private decision only when the state has
exercised coercive power or has provided significant encouragement, either
covert or overt, to such an extent that the private decision becomes a state
decision.' 12 The "nexus" test, the third test, concerns the question of whether
the state has reached a position of interdependence with the challenged
activities of an otherwise private individual so as to make the state a joint
participant in the challenged activity." 3 The fourth test applicable to the
state actor issue, the "joint action" test, concerns whether the private party
has participated jointly with state officials in a prohibited act sufficiently to
characterize that party as a state actor." 4 In Lugar, the Court held that a
private party's joint participation with state officials under a procedurally
defective statute in the seizure of disputed property was sufficient to char-
acterize that party as a state actor for purposes of the fourteenth amend-
ment. I' To meet the first step in the requirement for determining the presence
of state action, the Court held that the statutory scheme permitting the
unconstitutional attachment of property upon the ex parte application of
one party to a private dispute was a product of state action." 6 Consequently,
the plaintiff had presented a valid cause of action under section 1983 by
challenging the state statute as procedurally defective under the due process
clause."1
7
In light of the Lugar opinion, a principal must establish two elements
to meet the state action, or color of state law requirement. First, a principal
must demonstrate that the surety's conduct resulted from the exercise of a
right or privilege which the state had created in a state statute." s Courts
essentially have met this step by holding that state action occurs when a
surety acts pursuant to a state statute authorizing surety arrests under a
112. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 170 (1970) (Court stated that state is
responsible for discriminatory act of private party when state, by law, has compelled act). In
Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., the United States Supreme Court stated that it makes no difference
whether a statutory provision, or a custom having the force of law, compels the forbidden act.
Id. at 171.
113. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722-26 (1960) (discussion of
relationship between state and restaurant as indicating existence of state action in conduct of
restaurant). In Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., a restaurant refused to serve a negro
patron. Id. at 716. The restaurant was located in a parking building that an agency of the state
of Delaware owned and operated. Id. The United States Supreme Court held that the state had
participated in the discriminatory action of the restaurant because the state was in a position
of interdependence with the restaurant. Id. at 725. The Court found the interdependent
relationship from the mutual conferral of benefits between the agency and the restaurant, from
the fact that the restaurant was an integral part of the public building, and from the obligations
and responsibilities of the agency for the operation of the restaurant. Id. at 724.
114. See Lugar, 457 U.S. at 939-41 (discussion of joint activity test in context of prejudg-
ment attachment of property).
115. Id. at 941.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 942.
118. See supra notes 105-07 and accompanying text (discussion of two-step procedure in
determining presence of state action).
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bench warrant or bail piece." 9 Alternatively, a principal may demonstrate
that the surety's conduct resulted from a right exercised under a procedurally
defective statute. 120 A statute is procedurally defective either because the
statute has failed to establish appropriate safeguards governing surety ar-
rests, 121 or permits the attachment of property upon the exparte application
of one party to a private dispute.122 To meet the second element of the state
action requirement, the principal must demonstrate that the surety is a "state
actor" by applying one or more of the tests discussed in Lugar.2 Under the
public function test, a court may perceive the bondsman as exercising the
power of arrest, the exercise of which constitutes a traditionally exclusive
function of the state. 24 Under the state compulsion test, a court may conclude
that the bondsman is a state actor when the bondsman acts pursuant to a
state statute authorizing an arrest warrant or bail piece as the basis for the
bondsman's authority to arrest.'2 s A court may conclude under the nexus
test that a sufficient symbiotic relationship exists between a state and the
activities of a bondsman to make the bondsman a state actor. 26 A symbiotic
119. See Maynard v. Kear, 474 F. Supp. 794, 800 (N.D. Ohio 1979) (bondsmen's actions
pursuant to state bench warrant obtained under state statute constituted state action); Smith v.
Rosenbaum, 333 F. Supp. 35, 39 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (bondsman's actions pursuant to state statute
authorizing bail piece constituted state action), aff'd, 460 F.2d 1019 (1972).
120. See Lugar, 457 U.S. at 939-41 (discussion of claim involving procedurally defective
statute as properly actionable under § 1983 if claimant also meets "state action" element).
121. See infra notes 137-43 and accompanying text (discussion of procedural safeguards
under fourth and fourteenth amendment applicable to surety arrests).
122. See Lugar, 457 U.S. at 942 (due process procedures applicable when state has created
system permitting attachment of property on application of one party to a private dispute);
supra text accompanying notes 115-17 (discussion of necessity for hearing prior to attachment
of property on ex parte application of one party to private dispute).
123. See supra notes 109-14 and accompanying text (discussion of four tests used in
determining whether private party is state actor).
124. See Citizens for Pre-Trial Justice v. Goldfarb, 88 Mich. App. 519, 556, 278 N.W.2d
653, 670 (1979) (bondsmen exercise arrest power that clearly is adjunct of state's sovereignty),
modified, 327 N.W.2d 910 (1982); cf. Thompson v. McCoy, 425 F. Supp. 407, 409-11 (D.S.C.
1976) (state statute authorizing store security guard to make arrests is grant of police power
and arrest is, therefore, under color of state law). See generally Hansen, supra note 40 at 630-
32 (discussion of application of public function doctrine to surety arrests).
125. See Hansen, supra note 40 at 632-36 (discussion of state compulsion test in context
of surety arrest). A demonstration that a statute authorizes and encourages bondsmen to arrest
principals will not satisfy the state compulsion test if a bondsman has an alternative means
available for surrendering the principal to court. Id. at 634. If the state statute permits the
surety to employ police officers to aid in the arrest then surety arrest is only one alternative
and, therefore, will not meet the compulsion test. Id. Courts that have found the conduct of
bondsmen to constitute state action pursuant to the compulsion test have reached their conclusion
by holding that the bondsmen relied on state statutes which encouraged or authorized surety
arrests. Id. at 635; see Maynard v. Kear, 474 F. Supp. 794, 801 (N.D. Ohio 1979) (state action
lent authority to state to bondsmen); Hill v. Toll, 320 F. Supp. 185, 187 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (state
statute encouraged bondsman's conduct).
126. See Ouzts v. Maryland Nat'l Ins. Co., 505 F.2d 547, 555-62 (9th Cir. 1974) (Hufstedler,
J., dissenting) (discussion of bondsmen as state actors), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 949 (1975). In
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relationship results from the state's regulation of, benefit from, and conferral
of the arrest power on sureties.' 27 Finally, a court may conclude under the
joint activity test that the surety has been a joint participant with state
officials in arresting a principal. A surety acts jointly with state officials
when the surety obtains bail pieces and bench warrants. 2 A surety also acts
jointly with state officials when the surety obtains a principal's release from
jail or uses jail facilities while returning a principal to the jurisdiction of the
court issuing the bond. 29 Additionally, a surety acts jointly with state officials
when state law enforcement officers aid a surety in arresting a principal.'
30
Ouzis v. Maryland Nat'l Ins. Co., the United States Supreme Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit held that a bondsman's conduct did not constitute state action and, therefore, would
not support a claim under § 1983. Id. at 555, supra note 42 (discussion of facts in Ouzis).
Judge Hufstedler dissented however, stating that the bondsmen were acting under color of state
law. Ouzts, 505 F.2d at 556. The judge reasoned that substantial governmental cooperation
made possible the maintenance of the system of quasi-private bail ultimately leading to the
violation of the principal's civil rights. Id. at 557. Judge Hufstedler determined that state action
occurred when judicial officers determined eligibility and amounts for bail, imposed bail
conditions, and revoked bail ordering recommitments of the principal. Id. The judge stated that
state action also occurred when state police and judicial officers made the judicial process
available to the bondsmen as well as when the state contributed its coercive power to aid in the
rearrest and detention of the principal. Id. Additionally, Judge Hufstedler believed the state
benefitted from the arrangement by saving the expense involved in housing, feeding, clothing
and guarding prisoners. Id. The judge stated that the fact that the state extensively regulates
bondsmen indicated the important public function that bondsmen serve. Id. at 559. Judge
Hufstedler maintained that the state-licensed and regulated bondsmen are an integral part of
the state's program of trial release, and, therefore, the actions of the bondsmen fulfilled the
state action requirement. Id. In sum, according to the Ouzts dissent, state action occurs because
of the general governmental nature of the bail system, the comprehensive statutory scheme for
licensing and regulating bondsmen, the state's grant to bail bondsmen of police powers not
enjoyed by private citizens generally, and the reliance by defendants upon their statutory powers
in effecting the arrest of the principal. Id. at 556; see also Citizens for Pre-Trial Justice v.
Goldfarb, 88 Mich. App. 519, 557-59, 278 N.W.2d 653, 670-73 (1979) (symbiotic relationship
exists between professional bondsmen and state), modified, 327 N.W.2d 910 (1982). In Citizens
For Pre-Trial Justice v. Goldfarb, the Michigan Court of Appeals stated in dicta that a symbiotic
relationship between bondsmen and the state indicated that state action existed. Id. at 558, 278
N.W.2d at 672-73. According to the Goldfarb court, the bondsmen's relationship with a court
is quasi-official. Id. at 558, 278 N.W.2d at 673. Furthermore, the Goldfarb court noted that
the state receives benefits from the relationship because the bondsman relieves the state from
the burden of caring for the accused. Id. at 558, 278 N.W.2d at 673.
127. See supra note 126 (discussion of state's regulation of, benefit from and conferral of
the arrest power on sureties).
128. See Maynard v. Kear, 474 F. Supp. 794, 801 (N.D. Ohio 1979) (joint activity existed
when court issued bench warrant pursuant to state statute upon which surety arrested principal);
Hill v. Toll, 320 F. Supp. 185, 186-87 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (joint activity existed when court issued
bail piece pursuant to state statute upon which surety arrested principal).
129. See McCaleb v. Peerless Ins. Co., 250 F. Supp. 512, 514 (D. Neb. 1965) (bondsman
lodged principal in various jails during 80-hour trip home); United States v. Trunko, 189 F.
Supp. 559, 562 (E.D. Ark. 1960) (court noted bondsman's intention to lodge principal at various
jails enroute to jurisdiction of court issuing bond).
130. See MICH. Cop. LAWS ANN. § 765.26 (West 1982) (provision entitling surety to
assistance of sheriff, chief of police of any city, or any officer in making arrest of principal);
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By demonstrating that a surety is a state actor and that the surety's conduct
has resulted from a right or privilege which the state has created, a principal
will have met the state action or color of state law requirement necessary to
bring suit under section 1983.'3'
After meeting the color of state law requirement under section 1983, a
principal must demonstrate that the actions of a surety have deprived the
principal of a right secured under the United States Constitution. 2  The
principal must claim that the state has deprived the principal of liberty or
property without due process of law conferred under the fourteenth amend-
ment. 3  By means of the due process clause, the fourteenth amendment
selectively incorporates certain provisions of the Bill of Rights. 3 4 Generally,
the Supreme Court will incorporate under the fourteenth amendment a right
that the Court considers fundamental to the American scheme of justice.'15
The Supreme Court has held that the fourth amendment protections against
unreasonable searches and seizures and the requirements for obtaining search
warrants are among the fundamental rights which the fourteenth amendment
protects. 36 A principal, therefore, may assert fourth amendment rights in a
section 1983 suit as violations of the fourteenth amendment due process
clause.
Prior case law has not addressed specifically the bounds of fourth
amendment rights in the context of a rearrest by a bondsman.1 7 The fourth
see also United States v. Roper, 702 F.2d 984, 988-89 (1lth Cir. 1983) (court stating that search
for fugitives by bail bonding company is service to judicial system, and police assistance in
search is reasonable).
131. See supra notes 100-104 and accompanying text.
132. See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text (discussion of elements necessary for
principal to establish in § 1983 suit).
133. See U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV. (amendment prohibits states from denying to citizens
equal protection of the laws).
134. See generally Daykin, The Constitutional Doctrine of Incorporation Re-Examined, 5
U.S.F.L. REv. 61, 61-63 (1970) (discussion of incorporation doctrine through analysis of United
States Supreme Court cases applying provisions of first eight amendments to states through
fourteenth amendment); see also Frankfurter, Memorandum on "Incorporation" of the Bill of
Rights Into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 78 Htav. L. REv. 746,
746-83 (1965) (collection of cases rejecting claims that certain provisions of first eight amend-
ments to constitution apply to states through incorporation under fourteenth amendment).
135. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 793-796 (1969) (court held that fifth amend-
ment prohibition against double jeopardy is fundamental right and should apply to states
through fourteenth amendment). The United States Supreme Court in Benton v. Maryland
rejected the idea that the states could deny basic constitutional rights if the totality of the
circumstances did not disclose a denial of fundamental fairness. Id. at 795. The Court noted
that once the Court decides that a particular Bill of Rights guarantee is fundamental to the
American scheme of justice, the same constitutional standards apply against both the state and
federal governments. Id.
136. See Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 549 (1978) (fourth amendment is
applicable to states by virtue of fourteenth amendment); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655
(1961) (fourth amendment rights are enforceable through due process clause of fourteenth
amendment).
137. See Maynard v. Kear, 474 F. Supp. 794, 801 (N.D. Ohio 1979) (court attempted to
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amendment to the United States Constitution protects the right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreason-
able searches and seizures. 3 8 By means of fourteenth amendment incorpo-
ration, the fourth amendment also requires that the state issue warrants only
upon probable cause, naming the specific places to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.'3 9 Upon establishment of a surety's conduct
as state action, certain areas of fourth amendment protections such as the
requirements of the use of reasonable force and means,1 40 warrants,' 4' and
hearings' 42 are applicable to the surety arrest.
14
Under the fourth amendment, arrests by police officers may not involve
more than the use of reasonable or necessary force.'" Reasonable force is
that force necessary under the circumstances to make the arrest or prevent
the escape of the accused.' 45 The United States District Court for the District
of Minnesota has noted that sureties must stay within the bounds of
reasonable means, including force, in arresting principals, and has implied
that sureties would be liable in tort to principals for improper custody. 4,
The Alabama Court of Appeals has indicated that courts should control the
use of unnecessary force by sureties by controlling the use of weapons.
47
define fourth, sixth and eighth amendment rights applicable to arrests by bondsmen).
138. U.S. CoNsr. amend. IV.
139. Id.
140. See infra notes 144-58 and accompanying text (discussion of requirement of use of
reasonable force and means in context or surety arrest).
141. See infra notes 159-82 and accompanying text (discussion of warrant requirements in
context of surety arrests).
142. See infra notes 184-222 and accompanying text (discussion of notice and opportunity
to be heard in hearing in context of surety arrest).
143. See Kear v. Hilton, 699 F.2d 181, 182 (4th Cir. 1983) (court noted need for hearing
before surety arrest); Maynard v. Kear, 474 F. Supp. 794, 801-03 (N.D. Ohio 1979) (court
stated that surety arrests are subject to requirement that arrests may involve use of only
reasonable force and means but also stated that surety arrest does not require use of warrants).
144. See Costello v. United States, 298 F.2d 99, 100 (9th Cir. 1962) (court held that police
used reasonable force in striking accused on head with sidearm when accused charged police
officers after announcement of arrest). In Costello v. United States, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the basic principle that police officers should make
arrests peaceably if possible and only forcibly if necessary. Id.
145. See Moore v. Bishop, 338 F. Supp. 513, 515 (E.D. Tenn. 1972) (accused alleged that
police used unnecessary force in subduing accused and unnecessary force after handcuffing
accused). The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee in Moore v.
Bishop emphasized the duty of a police officer to avoid using unnecessary violence in effecting
an arrest. Id. Additionally, the Moore court emphasized that an officer may not use force or
violence disproportionate to the extent of the resistance offered. Id. Finally, the Moore court
indicated that an officer may shoot only when appearances justify a fear of suffering serious
injury or loss of life. Id.
146. See Curtis v. Peerless Ins. Co., 299 F. Supp. 429, 435 (D. Minn. 1969) (purpose of
rearrest by sureties must be proper in light of sureties' undertaking); accord Smith v. Rosenbaum,
333 F. Supp. 35, 39 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (court cited Curtis as support for nonliability of surety
except in cases in which surety has transgressed bounds of reasonable means or improper
purpose), aff'd, 460 F.2d 1019 (3rd Cir. 1972).
147. See Shine v. State, 44 Ala. App. 171, __, 204 So. 2d 817, 826 (1967) (discussion
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According to the Alabama Court of Appeals, courts should investigate every
occasion in which a surety claims to need weapons and should require law
enforcement officials to accompany the surety on such occasions. 4 Further-
more, arrests by police officers for misdemeanors when the arrestee's resist-
ance is nonviolent will not justify the use of weapons. 149 As a general rule,
in the case of a misdemeanor, an officer has no right, except in self-defense,
to shoot or kill the offender in effecting the arrest, even when the offender
flees. 50 Since many of the violent arrests in which bondsmen use weapons
occur in cases of misdemeanors and involve small amounts of money,' a
court may wish to extend the misdemeanor principle to surety arrests.
In addition to the requirement of reasonable force, courts have inter-
preted the fourth amendment to require an arresting officer to give notice
of the officer's identity and purpose when demanding entrance into a dwelling
place. 5 2 The prevailing view is that entry without notice is possible only
when the officer acts on a reasonable good-faith belief that compliance with
the notice requirement would frustrate an arrest, endanger lives, or permit
the destruction of evidence. 53 In Read v. Case, 154 the Connecticut Supreme
Court held that a bondsman in a surety arrest must notify a principal of the
reason for the bondsman's appearance and must request admission before
making any attempt to enter the principal's home forcibly.'55 The Read
Court noted that the only valid excuse for a bondsman's failure to meet the
demand-notice requirement was the bondsman's belief that his personal
of use of force in surety's arrest of principal). In Shine v. State the Alabama Court of Appeals
stated that a court should reexamine the means used by bondsman in arresting principals. Id.
at -, 204 So.2d at 826. According to the Shine court, the "pay or get shot" attitude of
bondsmen had continued for too long, and indicated the need for the court to control the
bondsmen's use of weapons. Id.
148. Id. at -, 204 So.2d at 826.
149. See Weissengoff v. Davis, 260 F. 16, 18-19 (4th Cir.) (discussion of use of force by
police officer in misdemeanor arrest), cert. denied, 250 U.S. 674 (1919); cf. Shine v. State, 44
Ala. App. 171, -, 204 So. 2d 817, 823 (1967) (discussion of use of force in arrest of
principal by surety when force resulted in death of surety).
150. Shine, 204 So.2d at 823.
151. See, e.g., Curtis v. Peerless Ins. Co., 299 F. Supp. 429, 431 (D. Minn. 1969)
(principal's bond was $350 on charge of driving while intoxicated); McCaleb v. Peerless Ins.
Co., 250 F. Supp. 512, 514 (D. Neb. 1965) (principal's bond was worth $200 on charge of
violating traffic laws); United States v. Trunko, 189 F. Supp. 559, 560 (E.D. Ark. 1960)
(principal's bond was $500 on misdemeanor charge of driving while intoxicated).
152. See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 38 (1963) (discussion of demand-notice requirement
in arrest by police officer).
153. See id. (demand-notice requirements are not applicable when need to prevent destruc-
tion of evidence exists); People v. Maddox, 46 Cal. 2d 301, 306, 294 P.2d 6, 9 (Cal.) (court
noted that three exceptions to demand-notice requirement include need to prevent destruction
of evidence, increase in peril to officer's life and frustration of arrest), cert. denied, 352 U.S.
858 (1956).
154. 4 Conn. 166 (1822).
155. See id. at 168 (court limited damages to those actually sustained when bondsman
broke door of principal's house).
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safety or that of an agent was in jeopardy from the intended violence of a
principal. 56 Requiring sureties to identify themselves and to give notice of
their legal power and the reason for the arrest would benefit principals since
recapture situations often involve agents, commonly called "bounty hunters"
whom principals never have seen,5 7 and who do not indicate the reasons for
the arrest.'
In addition to requirements of reasonable force and means, the fourth
amendment imposes certain warrant requirements on police officers.' 9 Al-
though the Supreme Court has expressed a strong preference that police
officers should obtain arrest warrants when practicable, the Court has not
required the use of arrest warrants in all circumstances. 160 Relying on a
strong common-law tradition, the Supreme Court has held that warrantless
public arrests are permissible if based on probable cause.' 6' In Payton v.
New York, 162 the United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether
the Constitution requires a police officer to obtain a warrant to enter private
premises to make an arrest.' 63 Confirming that the fourth amendment draws
156. Id. at 168. In Read v. Case, the Connecticut Supreme Court did not require the surety
to give notice of presence and to request entrance because the principal already knew the reason
for the surety's presence and because the principal had barricaded and armed himself to defeat
the surety's right of recapture. Id.
157. See Ouzts v. Maryland Nat'l Ins. Co., 505 F.2d 547, 549-50 (9th Cir. 1974) (bonding
agent hired bounty hunter unknown to principal, to take principal into custody), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 949 (1975); United States'v. Trunko, 189 F. Supp. 559, 562 (E.D. Ark. 1960) (bonding
agent Trunko did not advise principal that Trunko was acting as agent of bonding company).
158. See United States v. Trunko, 189 F, Supp. 559, 562 (E.D. Ark. 1960) (neither principal
Williams nor family knew why bonding agent was arresting Williams).
159. See infra notes 160-65 and accompanying text (discussion of warrant requirements in
context of arrests by law enforcement personnel).
160. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 421-23 (1976). The issue in United States
v. Watson concerned whether a law enforcement official could make a public arrest for a felony
without a warrant but with probable cause. Id. at 412-17. According to the facts in Watson, a
postal inspector had made a warrantless arrest of a suspect based on information that a reliable
informant had supplied. Id. at 412-13. The trial court held the arrest unconstitutional because
the postal inspector had failed to secure an arrest warrant despite ample opportunity to do so.
Id. at 414. The United States Supreme Court, despite a preference for warranted arrests, held
that a warrantless public arrest based on probable cause was constitutional. Id. at 423.
161. See id. at 423. The Supreme Court in United States v. Watson not only considered
the strong common-law tradition in holding that warrantless public arrests based on probable
cause were constitutional, but the Court also considered congressional preferences. Id. The
Court noted that, prior to 1951, Congress had conditioned the warrantless arrest powers of
federal law enforcement officials upon the exigent circumstances of the arresting officers'
reasonable grounds to believe that the accused would flee if the officers took the time to obtain
warrants. Id. at 423 n.13. Congress eliminated the condition of exigent circumstances in 1951.
Id.
162. 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
163. Id. at 575. In Payton v. New York, six police officers visited Payton's apartment at
7:30 a.m. intending to make a warrantless arrest of Payton for the murder of a gas station
attendant two days earlier. Id. No one was present, but police seized a .30 caliber shell casing
that lay in plain view. Id. 576-77. Payton challenged the admission of the casing into evidence
at the trial because the officers had failed to seize the evidence properly. Id. 577. The Payton
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a firm line at the entrance of a house for the seizure of either persons or
property, the Supreme Court held that a warrant is necessary to cross the
threshold of a home to make a routine felony arrest of a fugitive, absent
exigent circumstances.' 4 The Constitution also requires a police officer to
obtain a search warrant before entering the house of a third party, absent
exigent circumstances, to arrest a fugitive.
65
In considering the issue of whether a surety must obtain an arrest
warrant for a public arrest of a principal, courts have relied on the common-
law tradition of Taylor 66 and Fitzpatrick67 to hold that a surety does not
need a warrant. 68 Even the Maynard court, the only court to consider in
depth the fourth amendment rights of principals under the Constitution, was
hesitant to require arrest warrants.' 69 In United States v. Holmes, 70 however,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit addressed the
issue of whether a warrantless rearrest by federal officers of a bailed
defendant was valid.' 7' While recognizing that law enforcement officers may
Court held that, through the fourteenth amendment, the fourth amendment prohibits state
police officers from making a warrantless and nonconsensual entry into a suspect's home to
make a routine felony arrest. Id. 583-603. Because the search of Watson's apartment was illegal,
the United States Supreme Court reversed Watson's conviction and remanded the case to the
New York Court of Appeals. Id. at 603.
164. Id. at 590. The Supreme Court in Payton v. New York found persuasive the reasoning
that an arrest in a home involves not only the invasion of privacy attendant to all arrests but
also an invasion of the sanctity of the home, an invasion which was too substantial to permit
without a warrant. Id. at 588-89.
165. See Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 211-16 (1981) (Court compared search
for person to search for object in holding that search warrant is necessary before entering home
of third party to arrest fugitive).
166. See Taylor v. Taintor, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 366, 371 (1872) (no arrest warrant necessary
in arrest of principal by surety). In Taylor v. Taintor, the United States Supreme Court reasoned
that a surety did not need to obtain an arrest warrant as the arrest was comparable to the
rearrest of an escaping prisoner by a sheriff. Id.; see supra notes 18-26 and accompanying text
(discussion of Taylor).
167. See Fitzpatrick v. Williams, 46 F.2d 40, 41 (5th Cir. 1931) (surety does not need
process to arrest principal wherever principal may be); id. at 40 (surety did not need to obtain
arrest warrant because surety was acting upon private contract right of recapture).
168. See, e.g., Maynard v. Kear, 474 F. Supp. 794, 802 (N.D. Ohio 1979) (surety does not
need to obtain warrant before arresting principal); Curtis v. Peerless Ins. Co., 299 F. Supp.
429, 435 (D. Minn. 1969) (surety may take principal into custody without legal process); United
States v. Trunko, 189 F. Supp. 559, 563 (E.D. Ark. 1960) (surety has right to recapture
defaulting principal without resort to extradition or other legal process).
169. See Maynard, 474 F. Supp. at 802. In Maynard v. Kear, the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Ohio discussed the fourth amendment rights potentially
relevant to the bondsman who acts under color of state law. Id. In the discussion, the Maynard
court, while hesitant to require a bondsman to obtain a warrant, did leave open the possibility
that under the holding of United States v. Holmes, a court might impose a warrant requirement.
Id.; infra notes 170-74 (discussion of decision by Holmes' court that warrantless rearrest by
police officers of bailed defendant was not valid).
170. 452 F.2d 249 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 909 (1972).
171. See United States v. Holmes, 452 F.2d 249, 260-61 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 407
[Vol. 42:215
BAIL BONDSMEN
rearrest principals for a variety of reasons, the Seventh Circuit concluded
that the fourth amendment applied to the rearrest of a bailed defendant by
federal officers. 172 The Holmes court emphasized that the fourth amendment
requires both a reasonable foundation for a criminal charge and the avoid-
ance of arbitrary and unreasonable interferences with privacy.' 73 A court
could apply the Seventh Circuit's reasoning in Holmes to a surety arrest
situation, and conclude that warrants for public arrests by sureties are
necessary. 74
Similarly, a court may wish to impose a warrant requirement before
permitting a bondsman to enter a principal's home or the home of a third
party. 75 The Taylor court specified that, if necessary, a bondsman may
break and enter a principal's house to make an arrest, but Taylor neither
supports nor prohibits the proposition that a surety may enter the dwelling
of a third party. 76 However, entry into a third-party dwelling was at issue
in the case of Livingston v. Browder.177 In Livingston, a mother brought suit
against a bondsman who had entered the mother's house without permission
and arrested her son. 78 The Livingston court held that a surety has the
U.S. 909 (1972). In United States v. Holmes, government agents without a new warrant
rearrested defendant Oliver, who was free on bail. Id. at 260. The government argued that the
return of a new indictment against Oliver established the probable cause necessary to make the
rearrest. Id. Oliver argued that the warrantless arrest was unconstitutional. Id. According to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, two factors were important in
resolving the issue of whether the rearrest was constitutional. Id. First, the government must
have reason to believe that the prospective arrestee is guilty of a crime. Id. Second, the arrest
must serve some purpose. Id. According to the Seventh Circuit, probable cause existed because
the defendant was under indictment. Id. at 260-61. The Holmes court concluded, however, that
the rearrest served no purpose because in the contemplation of the law, the bailed defendant
was already in custody. Id. at 261. While the Holmes court recognized that many valid reasons
for rearrest existed, the court concluded that an arrest needed more justification than continuing
knowledge of guilt of the offense charged. Id. Without more, according to the Holmes court,
a defendant would be subject to the type of harassment prohibited by the fourth amendment.
Id. In Oliver's case, if the judge had ordered a change in the defendant's custodial status as a
result of the new charges, then the subsequent arrest would have served a purpose. Id. The
Holmes court also noted the fact that the government originally had sought to justify Oliver's
arrest on the ground that a warrant had, in fact been issued. Id. The government's assertion,
however, was in error. Id.
172. Id. at 261.
173. Id.
174. See id. at 260-61. One may distinguish the decision in United States v. Holmes from
a surety rearrest situation in that the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
emphasized that the new charge and new warrant were necessary to avoid the harassment of
the arrestee by the police. Id. at 261; see also supra note 171 (discussion of reasoning in Holmes
decision).
175. See infra notes 176-82 and accompanying text (discussion of common law principles
applicable to entry into third party dwellings by either sureties or police officers).
176. Taylor, 83 U.S. at 371.
177. 51 Al. App. 366, -, 285 So. 2d 923, 924 (Ala. Civ. App. 1973).
178. Id. at -, 285 So. 2d at 924-25.
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authority to enter the dwelling of a third party to arrest the principal. 7 9 The
Livingston court, however, imposed certain conditions on sureties entering
third-party dwellings. 80 The Livingston court stated that the surety must
have reasonable and just cause to believe the principal is in the dwelling,
must properly identify himself, and must use reasonable means to gain
entry.' 8' Relying on the rationale expressed in Livingston and on the policies
supported by the United States Supreme Court in recent decisions requiring
police officers to obtain arrest and search warrants, a court reasonably could
impose a warrant requirement on sureties acting under color of state law
before allowing entry into homes or private dwellings.
8 2
In addition to requiring the use of reasonable force and means, and. the
use of warrants in appropriate circumstances, the fourth and fourteenth
amendments also require hearings in certain situations before a state may
deprive an individual of liberty or property. 8 3 In examining violations of a
principal's constitutional rights in a section 1983 suit, courts may compare
the principal's right to a hearing to that right which is available to an
arrestee.'8 4 Additionally, a court may compare the principal's right to a
hearing to that of a probationer or parolee in the correctional process prior
to revocation of probation or parole. 85 Finally, a court may compare the
principal's right to a hearing to the right established for state enforcement
of a private contract right.
8 6
179. Id. at -, 285 So.2d at 927. In Livingston v. Browder, the Court of Civil Appeals
of the State of Alabama emphasized the strong public policy in preventing the principal from
leaving the jurisdiction of the bond agreement. Id. at __, 285 So.2d at 925. Additionally,
the Livingston court noted that, because of this strong public interest, the state permits the
surety wide discretion in determining the steps necessary to effect the apprehension of the
principal. Id. Furthermore, the Livingston court stated that the responsibility of the surety to
ensure the principal's appearance in court justifies the large amount of authority that the state
affords the surety. Id.
180. Id. at __, 285 So.2d at 926-27. In discussing the limits of a surety's authority, the
Court of Civil Appeals of the State of Alabama in Livingston v. Browder compared the arrest
of a principal by a surety to the arrest of a suspect by a police officer in discussing the issues
of reasonable force and means and warrant requirements. Id. at -, 285 So.2d at 926-27.
The Livingston court concluded that the law governing the use of reasonable means and force
and the lack of necessity for a warrant was the same for a surety as for a policeman. Id. at -
, 285 So.2d at 927. In Livingston, the surety entered the mother's house when the surety
observed the principal leaving through a back alley Id. The presence of these exigent circum-
stances may explain the Livingston court's decision that a warrant was not necessary. Id.
181. Id. at -, 285 So.2d at 926-27.
182. See supra notes 162-65 and accompanying text (discussion of warrant requirement
prior to entry into homes and third party dwellings).
183. See infra notes 184-226 and accompanying text (discussion of hearing requirements as
applied to different types of arrest and to property attachments).
184. See Livingston v. Browder, 51 Ala. App. 336, -, 285 So.2d 923, 926-27 (1973)
(comparison of surety arrest to arrest by police officer).
185. See infra notes 197-207 and accompanying text (discussion of right to hearing by
parolee or probationer upon revocation of parole or probation).
186. See infra notes 209-26 and accompanying text (discussion of right to hearing by
private party before attachment of property).
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The United Sates Supreme Court has addressed the issue of an arrestee's
right to a hearing during the arrest procedure. Under guidelines established
by the Supreme Court, since an arresting officer may arrest without a
warrant, the Constitution does not require a hearing to determine probable
cause prior to an arrest.3 7 Following the arrest, however, the fourth amend-
ment requires a judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to
extended restraint on liberty. s8 In such a hearing, the fourth amendment
does not require the full panoply of constitutional safeguards associated with
an adversarial hearing.'89 Instead, the hearing may be an informal procedure
before a judicial officer who is to make a determination of probable cause
for detention using the same standard of probable cause as that required for
an arrest.' 90 If a hearing is not conducted prior to the arrest, the judicial
officer must make the determination of probable cause promptly after the
arrest. 191
If a court determines that a bondsman has acted under color of state
law and considers the bondsman's actions to, be analogous to those of an
officer rearresting an individual on bal, then the court may find that a
hearing is necessary at some point in the surety-arrest procedure. 92 The
purpose of the hearing would be to articulate the cause for the rearrest and
to verify the identity of the arrestee. 93 Given the contractual nature of the
bond agreement, valid causes for a rearrest would include breaking the bail
contract by leaving the jurisdiction determined in the bail agreement, in-
creased risk to the bondsman, or the simple desire of the bondsman to be
relieved of the contractual obligation.194 The United States Supreme Court
187. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 423 (1976) (warrantless public arrest based
on law enforcement officer's determination of probable cause is constitutional); see also supra
notes 160-61 and accompanying text (discussion of circumstances under which warrantless arrests
are permissible).
188. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 113-14 (1975) (court struck down Florida statute
permitting state to detain person charged by information for substantial period solely on decision
of prosecutor).
189. See id. at 120 (Court reasoned that informal procedure is justifiable because of lesser
consequences, and because it is not critical stage in prosecution).
190. See id. at 120.
191. Id. at 125.
192. See Taylor v. Taintor, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 366, 371 (1872) (surety arrest is comparable
to rearrest of fugitive by sheriff).
193. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 847.5 (West 1970). California Penal Code § 847.5 totally
abrogates the right of a foreign bondsman to pursue, apprehend and remove a principal from
California without resort to process that includes hearing. Id. The purpose of the first
magistrate's hearing, as provided by the statute, is to review the surety's affidavit of facts in
support of the surety's request for an arrest warrant. Id. Only after a finding of probable cause
that the fugitive is present in the county and that the fugitive violated the conditions of bail,
will the magistrate issue an arrest warrant. Id. Following the arrest, the statute requires an
additional evidentiary hearing, with the fugitive present, to establish that the arrestee is the
person alleged to have violated bail and that the arrestee is indeed a fugitive from bail. Id.
194. See Taylor v. Taintor, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 336, 371 (1872) (surety may seize principal
whenever surety chooses); see also supra text accompanying note 193 (discussion of purposes
of evidentiary hearing following surety arrest).
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has stated that an arrest hearing, whether held before or after an arrest,
should furnish meaningful protection from unfounded interference with an
arrestee's liberty.1 95 A court could provide meaningful protection against
interference with a principal's liberty by requiring a surety to promptly
present the principal to a judicial officer in the jurisdiction in which the
arrest takes place. 196 Prompt presentation balances the rightful power of the
surety to revoke the contract with the due process requirements of protection
of the rearrested individual under the fourth and fourteenth amendments.
A court also may analogize the right of a principal to a hearing upon
revocation of the bail bond to the right of a parolee or a probationer to a
hearing on revocation of parole or probation. 97 Under the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment, a parolee has a right to a reasonably prompt
informal hearing, conducted by an impartial hearing officer near the place
of the alleged parole violation, to determine if reasonable grounds exist to
believe that the arrested parolee violated a parole condition.198 A probationer
195. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975) (discussion of purpose of hearing
following arrest).
196. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 847.5 (West 1970) (statute requires prompt presentation of
principal to magistrate immediately following arrest by surety).
197. See infra notes 198-208 and accompanying text (discussion of right to hearing by
probationer and parolee upon revocation of probation and parole and analogy to surety
revocation of bond); Citizens for Pre-Trial Justice v. Goldfarb, 88 Mich. App. 519, 559, 278
N.W.2d 653, 673 (1979) (comparison of liberty interests of parolee and principal), modified,
327 N.W.2d 910 (1982).
198. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 484-87 (1972). In Morrissey v. Brewer, the
Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment requires a state to afford a parolee an opportunity to be heard prior to revoking
parole. Id. at 477. In Morrissey, the Court heard the appeals of two petitioners. Id. at 473. In
both instances, the Iowa Board of Parole had revoked the petitioners' paroles without prior
hearings. Id. The reason given by the Iowa board for revocation of both paroles was the
violation of the territorial restrictions placed on the parolees. Id. at 473-74. In considering
whether due process applied to the parole system, the Morrissey Court described the function
of parole in the correctional process. Id. at 477. The Court described parole practices as an
integral party of the penal system, serving as a variation on the imprisonment of convicted
criminals. Id. According to the Morrissey Court, the parole system alleviates the costs to society
of keeping an individual in prison. Id. Additionally, the Court noted that in some cases the
Board grants parole automatically and in others, parole is a discretionary matter. Id. Further-
more, the Morrissey Court noted that the state, through the parole board, requires specific
restrictive conditions on a parolee. Id. The restrictive conditions inhibit the parolee's liberty
beyond that of an ordinary citizen, including the stipulation that the parolee remain under the
guidance of, and report to, the parole officer. Id. at 478. The parole officer generally decides
whether to order the revocation of parole. Id. at 478-79. The Morrissey Court distinguished
revocation of parole from criminal prosecution. Id. at 480. The agency supervising parole may
or may not be acting as an arm of the court. Id. Revocation deprives an individual only of a
conditional liberty, not the absolute liberty of an ordinary citizen. Id. The issue of whether the
requirements of due process apply to parole revocations turned on whether the nature of the
interest is one within the contemplation of the "liberty or property" language of the fourteenth
amendment. Id. at 481. The Morrissey Court concluded that the liberty, of a parolee, although
circumscribed, includes many of the core values of unqualified liberty and the loss of liberty is
grievous to the parolee. Id. at 482. Since liberty is valuable and is within the protection of the
fourteenth amendment, a termination of liberty calls for an orderly process. Id.
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also is entitled to a preliminary and final probation revocation hearing under
the same conditions specified for a parolee.' 99 Since parole and probation
revocation are not part of the criminal prosecution, neither parolees nor
probationers are entitled to a hearing subject to the full panoply of rights
applicable to the criminal prosecution process. 200 For both parolees and
probationers, however, the loss of significant liberty interests is involved in
revocation of freedom, and due process mandates a hearing of some type. 20'
If a court chooses to compare the revocation of parole and probation to the
revocation of a bail bond, the issue of whether procedural protections
demand a hearing for a principal will turn on the extent to which the
principal will suffer a grievous loss and whether the nature of this loss is
within the contemplation of the "liberty or property" language of the
fourteen amendment. 20 2 Since a principal, like a parolee, suffers a loss of a
significant liberty interest, a court could analogize the revocation of bail to
the revocation of parole and probation, and impose a due process require-
ment of a hearing before the revocation of bail.23
If a court did analogize the hearing requirements for revocation of parole
to the bail situation, the differences between principals and parolees indicate
that the hearings would serve different functions.2°4 Implicit in the system of
Principals are in analogous situation to parolees and probationers. The revocation agent,
either the surety or the parole officer, may or may not be acting as an arm of the court.
Compare Morrissey, 408 U.S at 480 (agency supervising parole may or may not be acting as
arm of court) with Citizens for Pre-Trial Justice v. Goldfarb, 88 Mich. App. 519, 558, 278
N.W.2d 653, 673 (1979) (bondsman's relationship with court is quasi-official), modified, 327
N.W.2d 910 (1982). Both bail and parole are extensions of prison. Compare Morrissey, 408
U.S. at 477 (parole is variation of imprisonment) with Taylor v. Taintor, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.)
366, 371 (1872) (dominion of surety is continuation of principal's original imprisonment). The
position of a parolee and a principal differs only in the requirement of a valid reason to revoke
freedom. Compare Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 479 (implicit in parole system is idea that parolee is
entitled to liberty so long as parolee abides by conditions of parole) with Taylor, 83 U.S. (16
Wall.) at 371 (surety may arrest at any time and for any reason).
199. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 781 (1973) (decision concerning need for
counsel for indigent parolees and probationers is subject to case-by-case analysis).
200. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480-89 (1972). The United States Supreme
Court in Morrissey v. Brewer held that a hearing to determine probable cause and to evaluate
contested facts was necessary upon revocation of parole. Id. at 488. According to the Court,
however, the hearing should consist of a narrow inquiry that would be flexible enough to
consider evidence not admissible in an adversary criminal trial. Id. at 489. The Morrissey Court
also declined to decide whether the parolee was entitled to the assistance of retained or appointed
counsel. Id.; see Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 781 (1973) (revocation hearing for
probationer is subject to same requirements of parolee).
201. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 789 (1973) (due process mandates hearing for
revocation of probation because loss of significant liberty interests are involved; Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972) (due process mandates hearing for revocation of parole
because loss of significant liberty interests are involved).
202. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (parolee's right to due process in
parole revocation turns on whether nature of parolee's interest is one within contemplation of
"liberty or property" language of fourteenth amendment).
203. See id. at 482 (parolee's liberty interest is within protection of fourteenth amendment).
204. See infra notes 205-08 and accompanying text (discussion of hearing for revocation
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parole is the idea that the parolee is entitled to retain his liberty so long as
the parolee abides by the conditions of the parole.2 5 Implicit in the bail
bond system is the right of the surety to revoke the bond for any reason the
surety chooses. 206 The purpose of a parole hearing is to determine whether
the parolee did, in fact, violate the conditions of parole and whether
revocation of parole is the best solution. 20 7 In contrast to a parole revocation
hearing, a hearing for a principal may occur before or after the arrest and
should reflect both the interests of the bondsman on the contract as well as
the interests of the state in assuring that a bondsman arrests pursuant to a
valid contract and that the bondsman arrests the individual named in the
contract.
20
A court could also analogize the issue of whether due process requires a
hearing for principals arrested by sureties acting under color of state law to
cases concerning state deprivation of property.209 According to traditional
case law, the contract between the surety and the principal is a private
contract and not a matter of criminal procedure. 2 0 Inserted into a typical
bond contract is a clause authorizing the surety to arrest and surrender the
principal at any time to the court issuing the bond. 211 Courts have continued
to hold that the bonding contract is legal,212 and, because the contract is
private, some courts hold that the fourteenth amendment is not applicable
to sureties exercising the arrest power. 2 3 When the surety is acting under
of bail as differing from hearing for revocation of parole).
205. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 479 (1972).
206. See Taylor v. Taintor, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 366, 371 (1872).
207. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1972).
208. See supra note 193 (discussion of hearing requirements under California Penal Code
§ 847.5).
209. See Kear v. Hilton, 690 F.2d 181, 182 (4th Cir. 1983) (discussion of due process
requirements applicable to bondsmen). In Kear v. Hilton, Kear a professional bondsman
apprehended a principal in Canada and transported the principal to Florida. Id. The displeased
Canadian officials sought to extradite Kear for kidnapping. Id. at 183. The United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld the lower court's denial of Kear's writ of habeas
corpus. Id. at 185. The Fourth Circuit stated that a surety's arrest power did not extend beyond
the territory of the United States. Id. at 182. The Fourth Circuit proceeded on the assumption
that the 1872 Taylor decision constituted the controlling law. Id. at 182 n.2. The Fourth Circuit
noted, however, that since 1872, the Supreme Court had imposed procedural due process
requirements on the reclamation of property and suggested that these requirements were
applicable to the bondsman's situation. Id.
210. See Fitzpatrick v. Williams, 46 F.2d 40, 40-41 (5th Cir. 1931) (discussion of private
contractual nature of bail bond agreement).
211. See Hansen, supra note 40, at 598 (discussion of typical ball bond contract); see also
3 Am. Jur. Legal Forms 2d Bail and Recognizance § 35.26 (1971) (provision authorizing surety
to arrest and surrender principal at any time in exoneration of surety's liability); 4 Am. Jur.
P1. & Pr. Forms (Rev.) Bail and Recognizance, form 91, 92 (1968) (provision authorizing surety
to arrest principal).
212. See Hansen, supra note 40, at 611 (discussion of legality of bail bond contracts).
213. See Citizens For Pre-Trial Justice v. Goldfarb, 88 Mich. App. 519, 566, 278 N.W.2d
653, 676 (1979) (court stated essence of bail bond contract is private undertaking), modified,
327 N.W.2d 910 (1982). But cf. supra notes 81-96 and accompanying text (courts held fourteenth
amendment applicable to surety arrest).
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color of state law, however, the analysis changes, because the state and the
private party are enforcing a private contract right. 214 The issue then becomes
whether due process rights, which apply to state deprivation of property
interests under a bail bond contract, require notice and opportunity for a
principal to be heard concurrent with the enforcement of specific provisions
of the bail contract on the application of a surety.
215
A leading United States Supreme Court case providing guidelines con-
cerning the procedural due process required before a state can deprive an
individual of a property interest pursuant to a private contract is Fuentes v.
Shevin.2 6 In Fuentes, the Court addressed the problem of replevin of goods
purchased under an installment sales contract upon application of a private
party.2 7 The Pennsylvania and Florida statutes in question permitted a
private party, without a hearing or prior notice to the other party, to obtain
a prejudgment writ of replevin through a summary process of ex parte
application to a court clerk.2 18 The statutes required the sheriff to execute
the writ by seizing the property. 2 9 The Fuentes Court held that the replevin
provisions of the state statutes were invalid under the fourteenth amendment
since the provisions constituted a deprivation of property without due process
of law by denying the right of one party to the dispute an opportunity to be
heard before the other party takes the chattels. 220 Additionally, the Fuentes
court held that procedural due process requires an opportunity for a hearing
before the state authorizes its agents to seize property in the possession of
one person under the application of another. 2 '
The Fuentes analysis arguably applies to the bail bond contract. 2n Under
the bail bond contract, the liberty interest of a principal is at least as
214. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 941 (1982) (fact that private individual
jointly participated with state officials in seizure of disputed property is sufficient to constitute
state action under fourteenth amendment).
215. See id. at 942 (court focused on state-created system whereby state officials attached
property on ex parte application of one party to private dispute).
216. 407 U.S. 67, 80-84 (1972) (procedural due process requires opportunity for hearing
before state authorizes agents to seize property in possession of person upon application of
another).
217. Id. at 69-70. In Fuentes v. Shevin, the contract in issue was a printed form sales
contract that included provisions for seller's repossession of the merchandise on buyer's default.
Id. at 94. The terms of the contract appeared in small type without accompanying clarifications.
Id.
218. See id. at 73-78; see also Fla. Stat. Ann. § 78.01 (Supp. 1972-1973) (amended 1973)
(statute permits any person whose goods are wrongfully detained to have writ of replevin); Fla.
Stat. Ann. § 78.07 (Supp. 1972-1973) (repealed 1973) (statute requires creditor to post bond
payable to defendant if defendant recovers judgment); PA. STAT. ANN., Tit. 12, § 1821 (1967)
(statute authorizes writ of replevin for prejudgment attachment of pr5perty).
219. Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 69.
220. Id. at 80-93.
221. Id. at 80-84.
222. See infra notes 223-26 and accompanying text (discussion of similarities in attachment
of interests by one party in a private contract dispute, whether party is creditor or bondsman).
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important to the principal as a property interest.2 3 Since the right to be
heard, whether liberty or property is at stake, is fundamental to the four-
teenth amendment, 224 the right to be heard before rearrest under a bail bond
contract is as constitutionally necessary as the right to be heard before
replevin under an installment sales contract. By analogy to Fuentes,
therefore, a state court reasonably could mandate that a principal be accorded
an opportunity for a hearing before a state authorizes bondsmen to seize the
liberty interests of a principal in the principal's possession under the con-
tract.
226
The broad grant of authority to bail bondsmen by the courts227 and by
state statutes28 has created a situation in which a surety may cause a principal
to suffer a deprivation of rights.229 To remedy this deprivation of rights, a
principal may sue the bondsman under section 1983 of title 42 of the United
States Code.2 0 To prevail in an action under section 1983, the principal must
prove that the bondsman acted under color of state law and that the
bondsman deprived the principal of a right, privilege, or immi.nity secured
under the constitution. 23' Under the Lugar analysis, a principal will present
a valid cause of action under section 1983 if the principal challenges the state
statute permitting surety arrests as procedurally defective under the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 232 Under the more traditional
approach, a principal will present a valid cause of action under section 1983
223. See Owenbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94, 110 (1921) (due process clause of fourteenth
amendment restrains state action and requires hearing whether liberty or property is at stake).
224. Id.
225. See Citizens For Pre-Trial Justice v. Goldfarb, 88 Mich. App. 519, 559, 278 N.W.2d
653, 673-74 (1979) (person released on bail bond contract enjoys core values of liberty, and
fourteenth amendment requires opportunity for hearing), modified, 327 N.W.2d 910 (1982).
226. See Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 84 (right to a hearing attaches to deprivation of interest
encompassed within the fourteenth amendment's protection). According to Fuentes v. Shevin,
the United States Supreme Court has permitted summary seizure of property only to collect the
internal revenue of the United States, to meet the needs of a national war effort, to protect
against the economic disaster of a bank failure, and to protect the public from misbranded
drugs and contaminated food. Id. at 91-92.
227. See supra notes 9-39 and accompanying text (discussion of broad common-law grant
of authority to bondsmen).
228. See supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text (discussion of state statutes regulating
and licensing bondsmen).
229. See supra notes 45-61 and accompanying text (discussion of surety abuse of principals
and reaction of courts under basic tort law).
230. See supra notes 62-96 and accompanying text (discussion of cases challenging bail
bond practices under § 1983).
231. See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text (discussion of elements necessary in §
1983 claim); supra notes 97-131 and accompanying text (discussion of requirements necessary
to meet the state action element); supra notes 132-226 (discussion of approaches applicable to
deprivation of constitutional right requirements.
232. See supra notes 115-17, 209-26 and accompanying text (application of specific Lugar
approach and analysis under fourteenth amendment).
[Vol. 42:215
BAIL BONDSMEN
by demonstrating state action233 and a deprivation of a right under the
fourteenth and fourth amendments.2 4 Effective use of section 1983 will
improve the quality of justice in the commercial bail bond system.
MARY LEE DOANE
233. See supra notes 118-31 and accompanying text (discussion of state action require-
ments).
234. See supra notes 132-208 and accompanying text (discussion of fourth and fourteenth
amendment protections actionable under § 1983).
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